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Introduction 
 
“Building security in our neighbourhood” is one of the three objectives of the European 
Security Strategy (ESS)
1,the document approved by the European Council in December 
2003  that  defines    the  major  threats  and    security  objectives  of  the  European  Union. 
Among the three objectives identified – addressing the key threats (terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime), building 
security  in  the  neighbourhood,  and  building  an  international  order  based  on  effective 
multilateralism  –  two  of them are linked  to the EU’s neighbourhood. The objective of 
addressing the key threats only indirectly relates to the areas surrounding the EU. Not all 
of these security challenges coming from the EU’s neighbourhood area are peculiar to the 
region; however,  the impact of these challenges on EU security, either real or perceived, 
can be still greater because of  geographical proximity.
2 On the other hand, the objective 
of building security in the neighborhood is directly related to the areas surrounding the EU.   
This  paper  analyses  whether  the  EU  can  be  effective  in  building  security  in  the 
Neighbourhood through the policy initiative that was launched specifically to achieve this  
goal: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In particular, the paper analyses whether 
the ENP is succeeding in meeting the security (sub)objectives laid out in the ESS. Finally, 
some policy recommendations designed to make the ENP more effective in meeting these 
objectives will be made. 
 
What does  “Building security in the Neighbourhood” mean?  
 
With regard to the objective of building security in its neighborhood, the ESS states that, 
“even in era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that 
countries  on  our  borders  are  well-governed.  Neighbours  who  are  engaged  in  violent 
conflict,  weak  states  where  organized  crime  flourishes,  dysfunctional  societies  or 
exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe”
3. Later on in the 
document, the ESS better defines the concept of building security and identifies a number 
of sub-objectives, that are at the same time means to achieve the main objective. The sub-
objectives identified by the ESS are the following:  
                                                 
1 European Council,  A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003. 
2 See S. Biscop, European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power, p. 35. 
3 A Secure Europe in a Better World…, p.7.    3 
- promoting a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the 
borders of the Mediterranean with whom to enjoy close and cooperative relations;  
the integration of acceding States (notably the Balkan countries); 
-  avoiding    the  creation  of    new  dividing  lines  in  Europe;  extending  the  benefits  of 
economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political 
problems in the area; 
- resolving the Arab/Israeli conflict; and 
- resolving the problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts in 
the Mediterranean area. 
 
Over the years, the EU has  developed a number of regional initiatives aimed at ensuring 
stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood. First of all comes enlargement, which  has 
been rightly heralded as the best success of European foreign policy, since it allowed the 
re-unification of Europe under the peaceful and free EU flag and brought stability and 
prosperity to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The EU also has put in 
place  the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Process  (SAP)  targeting  the  Western  Balkan 
countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) that have 
been granted by Brussels a future in the EU, once they have completed the SAP and 
comply with the enlargement criteria. Since 1995 the EU has also engaged the Southern 
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority,  Syria  and  Tunisia)  in  a  broad  initiative,  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership 
(EMP), better known as the Barcelona process, that aims at enhancing the cooperation 
between  the  EU  and  the  Southern  rim  of  the  Mediterranean  in  the  areas  of  security, 
economy  and  trade  and  culture.  However,  the  most  comprehensive  regional  initiative 
launched by the EU to deal with security in its proximity is the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)
4. This initiative was first devised by the Commission in 2003-2004
5, and later 
                                                 
4  There  is  an  ever-growing  literature  on  the  ENP.  See,  for  example:  R.  Dannreuther,  “Developing  the 
Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, 
issue 2, summer 2006, pp.183-201; R. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake 
with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review,  vol.  10,  issue  1,  spring  2005,  pp.  17-38;  M.  Emerson,  The  Wider  Europe  Matrix,  Centre  for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2003; H. Grabbe, How the EU should help its neighbours, CER Policy 
Brief, Centre for European Reform, London, June 2004; H. Haukkala and M. Arkady, “Beyond ‘Big Bang’: 
The Challenges of EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the East”, FIIA report 2004, n.9, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti 
(UPI-FIIA), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki; J. Batt, D. Lynch, A. Missiroli, M. Ortega and D. 
Triantaphyllou  (eds),  “Partners  and  Neighbours:  a  CFSP  for  a  Wider  Europe,  Chaillot  Papers,  no..  64, 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003; Karen E. Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood 
Policy”,  International  Affairs,  Vol.  81,  issue  4,  2005,  pp.  575-773;  M.  Comelli,  “The  Challenges  of  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy”, The International Spectator, Vol. 39. no. 3, July-September 2004, pp. 97-
110.    4 
approved by the Council. According to one of these Commission documents, the 2003 
“Wider Europe” Communication, the major aims of the ENP are twofold: 
- to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe; 
- to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a “ring of friends” - with 
whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. 
 
The security objectives of the ENP 
 
These two ENP objectives are also among the main sub-objectives of the ESS. In fact, the 
ESS  does  not  explicitly  refer  to  the  ENP  as  a  means  to  build  security  in  the  EU’s 
neighbourhood. However, it remains clear that  the ENP is the main instrument through 
which to pursue the objective of achieving security in the areas surrounding the EU
6. It is 
no coincidence that both the ESS and the ENP were conceived in the same period: the 
former was first outlined in June 2003 and finally approved by the European Council in 
December 2003, while the latter was first proposed by the Commission in March 2003 and 
shortly after that was approved by the Council, while its Strategy Paper was approved a 
little more than one year later, in May 2004.  
 
 First  of  all,  let  us  consider  the  question  whether  or  not  avoiding  the  creation  of  new 
dividing lines and developing  a zone of prosperity and stability (“a ring of friends”) can be 
effective  ways  to  achieve  security  Surely  they  are  much  in  line  with  the  EU’s  holistic 
concept of security, according to which security is multi-faceted and it is achieved by a 
panoply of different means: military and civilian, including political, diplomatic, trade and 
development activities. Europe after the end of the Cold War is not facing a direct military 
threat,  and  therefore  it  needs  to  address  its  new  security  challenges  (international 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and 
organised  crime)  with  different  means  and  instruments.  In  addition,  the    EU    has  a 
successful history of achieving security through these means.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: a new Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 
104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf> . 
Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, COM (2004), 373 
final, Brussels, 12 May 2004. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/strategy/Strategy_Paper_EN.pdf>. 
6 As for the security dimension of the ENP and the links between the ENP and the ESS, see G. Bonvicini, 
“The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Linkage with European Security” in F. Tassinari, P. Joenniemi 
and  U.  Jakobsen  (eds),  Wider  Europe.  Nordic  and  Baltic  Lessons  to  Post-Enlargement  Europe,  Danish 
Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006, pp. 21-28.  
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With regard to the issue of dividing lines, since its inception, European integration has 
altered the nature and function of borders within the Community/Union itself, i.e., borders 
between member states
7. For much of its history, European integration has been about 
free  circulation  between  member  states,  and  thus  about  loosening  intra-Community 
borders.  This  was  first  limited  to  trade.  It  then  developed  into  the  goal  of  an  internal 
market, intended as a space without internal frontiers, where free circulation of workers, 
goods, services and capital would be allowed and encouraged. Further still, the creation of 
the Schengen system in the 1990s was aimed at allowing the free circulation of citizens 
within  the  EU.    In  view  of  these successive policy changes, internal EU borders have 
acquired  different  meanings  over  time.  More  specifically,  while  internal  EU  borders 
continue to exist, delimiting spaces of sovereignty and accompanying citizenship rights 
and  obligations,  European  integration  has  eroded  some  of  the  functions  traditionally 
performed  by  borders.  Moreover,  differentiated  integration  in  policy  areas  such  as 
monetary policy and the free movement of people has also created a system of internal 
functional borders that does not coincide with the EU’s external borders. In view of the 
changing nature of the EU, the question of external borders has also been at the forefront 
of the European debate. 
However, the transformation of borders was limited to the countries that during the Cold 
War period belonged to the so called Western Europe and that were friends or allies of the 
United  States.  The  integration  of  a  country  that  was  subject  to  the  Soviet  sphere  of 
influence was not even conceivable at that time. 
 
A  similar  reasoning  can  be  applied  to the creation of a ring of stable and prosperous 
friends. The European integration process was designed to create a group of countries 
within which the high level of integration would make war among them an unthinkable way 
of  solving    conflict,  creating  something  similar  to  what  Karl  Deutsch  referred  to  as    a 
“security community”
8. According to Deutsch, security communities are likely to be formed 
among  states  that  share  strong  cultural  similarities,  which  favour  the  growth  in 
communication flows and social transactions through the creation of ad hoc institutions 
that manage in a cooperative manner the common problems and the reciprocal relations in 
                                                 
7 M. Comelli. E. Greco and N. Tocci, “From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders 
through the European Neighbourhood Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, forthcoming.  
8 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of 
Historical Experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.     6 
ways that exclude the final resort of armed conflict. In addition, one of the aims of the 
European Communities was also to create prosperity for the countries that decided to join 
the European integration project. The European Communities successfully pursued the 
objective of creating a zone of prosperity and stability, but that zone was exclusive for the 
European  countries  that  could  join  the  European  integration  project.  As  for  the  then 
Eastern neighbours, that is the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, they were under 
the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and had limited political and no contractual 
relations  with  Western  European  countries,  with  the  exception  of  Yugoslavia  and 
Romania
9. Therefore, the creation of a zone of stability and prosperity had only an internal 
dimension,  as  it  was  limited  to  the  countries  of  the  European  Communities  not  only 
because of the lack of competence to develop a regional security policy, but also because 
the geopolitical scenario of the Cold war did not allow it. On the contrary, a number of 
agreements,  mainly  about trade and cooperation, were signed with African, Asian and 
Latin  American  countries,  often  former  colonies  with  which  Member  States  wanted  to 
maintain preferential relations.  
 
It was only with the end of the Cold War that with the creation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)  the EU started to forge a security approach to its neighbourhood, 
mainly  to  the  east.    Since  then,  as  Antonio  Missiroli    effectively  argues  ,  the  EU  has 
pursued mainly two distinct approaches and policies vis-à-vis its neighbourhoods
10: 
- an approach aimed at stabilisation, mainly based on fostering regional cooperation and 
broad partnerships (regionalism); 
- an approach aimed at integration proper, i.e. at bringing neighbouring countries directly 
into the EU through a bilateral process based on strict conditionality. 
 
The first approach, which implied stabilisation as a goal and regionalism as a means was 
first  tentatively  adopted  towards  the  dissolving  Federation  of  Yugoslavia  in  the  early 
                                                 
9 The opening of official relations between the European Communities and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) that grouped the Soviet Union  and the Communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Union took place only in June 1988 with the Council Decision of 22 June 1988 on the conclusion of the Joint 
Declaration on the establishment of official relations between the European Economic Community and the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (88/345/EEC). Official Journal L 157/34, 24.6.1988 
See  also  I.  B.  Neuman,,  Soviet  Perceptions  of  the  European  Community,  1950-1988,  Oslo,  Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1989. 
10 A. Missiroli, “The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership”, in J. 
Batt, D. Lynch, A. Missiroli, M. Ortega and E. Triantaphyllou (eds.), Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a 
Wider Europe, Chaillot Paper no. 64, Institute for Security Studies, p.9.  
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1990s, but it was basically unsuccessful
11. It had more success when it was applied to the 
Central European countries and to the Baltic States (the Balladur pact of 1993-95 and the 
first Stability Pact). The second approach, based on integration into the EU as a goal and 
conditionality as a means, has achieved better results. Enlargement became a security 
policy, both by other means and by its own right
12. In addition, the enlargement approach 
was also the one that put a stronger emphasis on avoiding the creation of new dividing 
lines and extending the zone of economic prosperity and democratic peace
13 
 
However, continuing to use enlargement to achieve security in the neighbourhood poses 
some problems. First of all, the EU has for a few years been suffering from the so called 
“enlargement fatigue”. In Brussels as well as in the Old Member States enlargement is 
becoming less and less popular, and the cause of widespread fears for the public. The fear 
of a bigger and therefore less effective EU, with a long and cumbersome decision-making 
process, as well as the concern for an insufficient readiness of the new Member States are 
voiced in particular within a small group of people aware of the functioning of the EU 
mechanisms. Linked to this, some political leaders have asked for a slowing down of the 
enlargement process and for a clear definition of the EU’s borders for a number of different 
reasons: in order to make the Union function in a more effective way,  to avoid diluting the 
process of political integration in Europe (Romano Prodi
14) and  to avoid compromising the 
political and cultural identity of Europe (Angela Merkel
15). On top of that, there is the more 
widespread fear that  enlargement automatically implies a free movement of workers from 
the new to old Member States, which might make it more difficult for the citizens of the 
latter to find a job
16.  
                                                 
11 A. Missiroli, cit., p.10.  
12  Missiroli  argues that enlargement is a security policy “by other means because extending the Union’s 
norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive applicants has made instability and conflict on the 
Continent  decreasingly  likely.  And  it  is  a  security  policy  in  its  own  right,  too,  because  the  entrants have 
brought in interests and skills that have broadened the scope of common policies and strengthened the 
EC/EU as an international actor”. A. Missiroli, cit., p. 17.  
13 As Cristopher Hill has rightly argued, enlargement “can be seen as a commitment to a major new foreign 
policy on the part of the EU, that of changing the map of Europe to the East and to the South… the aim is to 
extend the zone of economic prosperity and democratic peace as a prophylactic against war, nationalism 
and  autocracy”.  C.  Hill,  “The  Geo-Political  Implications  of  Enlargement”,  in  J.  Zielonka  (ed.),  Europe 
Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, 2002.  
14 R. Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, Speech given at the sixth ECSA 
World  Conference on Peace, Stability and Security, Brussels, December 5, 2002 
15 European Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German Bundestag, Berlin, May 
11, 2006.  
16  Actually,  the  reality  is  different,  since  old  Member  States  were  very  reluctant  concerning  the  free 
movement  of workers. For example, of the 15 old Member States, only three of them (United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Sweden) allowed citizens from new Member States unrestricted access to their labour markets 
after the May 2004 enlargement. It was only during the summer 2006 that Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal   8 
Whatever  the  reasons,  it  has  become  increasingly  clear  that  despite  the  success  of 
enlargement,  or  precisely  because  of  it,  the  EU  cannot  indefinitely  rely  on  the  same 
instrument in order to achieve security in the neighbourhood. By doing so, the EU would 
be unable to provide the very benefits that have induced its neighbours to join it
17. It is 
interesting to note that in this climate, and particularly following the failed referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in May-June 2005, the EU, while not 
officially changing the objectives and instruments of the ENP, has begunto present it in a 
different way, with the focus on its usefulness for EU citizens as an instrument to achieve 
security by fighting threats coming from beyond the external borders of the Union, such as 
illegal immigration and other security problems
18.  
 
Indeed,  the  many  activities  carried  out  within  the  framework  of  the  ENP  designed  to 
pursue these goals do strengthen border controls, and are therefore apparently not in line 
with  the  aim  of  avoiding  the  creation  of  new  dividing  lines.  At  the  same  time,  some 
measures aimed at fighting illegal immigration, such as the readmission agreements with 
the  countries  of  origin  and/or  transit  of  the  illegal  immigrants  are  coupled  with  an 
agreement  on  the  facilitation  of  visa  regime  for  some  categories  of  people,  such  as 
academicians, students and athletes. A similar quid pro quo  between Brussels and the 
neighbouring  countries  has  already  been  agreed  upon  with  the  Ukraine  and  is  being 
finalised also with Morocco. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and Spain decided to follow suit. Nonetheless, the fear of a massive influx of jobseekers from Central and 
Eastern Europe has significantly increased in the past few years, in some countries in particular. According 
to Eurobarometer “The future of Europe” of May 2006, in 2003 43 % of people in the EU-15 feared that 
enlargement would result in an increase of unemployment in their countries. In 2006 that figure went up to 
63%. In Germany the figure increased from 56% to 80% during the same period, in France 72% and in 
Austria  75%  fear  that  enlargement  is  a  threat  to  their  jobs.  C.  Grant,  Europe’s  Blurred  Boundaries. 
Rethinking enlargement and neighbourhood policy, Centre for European Reform, London, 2006, p.23.  
17 W. Wallace, “Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for EU-25”, Policy Papers no.4, Paris, 
Notre Europe, 2003.  
18According to the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neigbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero 
Waldner, “ENP has enabled us to tackle some of our citizens’ most pressing concerns, like energy supplies, 
migration, security and stability. B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s 
Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, issue 2, summer 2006, p. 140.    9 
Principles and instruments of the ENP: similarities and differences with 
enlargement  
 
At  this  point  our  question  is  whether  or  not  the  EU  can  build  security  in  the  EU’s 
neighbourhood and notably whether the ENP can be effective in avoiding the creation of 
new dividing lines in Europe and develop a “ring of friends” or “well governed countries” a 
zone of prosperity and stability around its external borders.  
The two objectives “avoiding new dividing lines in Europe” and favouring the development 
of  a  ring  of  “well-governed  countries”  look  in  principle  compatible,  in  that  they  both 
emphasise the spreading of security and prosperity beyond the EU’s external borders and 
through co-operation.  
 
According to the EU’s narrative, one of the principles underlying the ENP is that both the 
EU  and  its  neighbours  share  the  same  values,  and  “In  return  for  concrete  progress 
demonstrating  shared  values  and  effective  implementation  of  political,  economic  and 
institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood 
should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.”
19 Leaving 
rhetoric aside, one can read between the lines that values are not really shared in practice, 
otherwise there would be no need for asking the governments for reform commitments that 
show  these  values  in  exchange  for  some  benefits.  Also  the  Article  III.293  of  the 
Constitutional Treaty states that the European Union should develop relations with third 
countries  that  share  its  values.  However,  the  same  article  also  states  that  the  EU’s 
external action should promote those values beyond its borders
20. The point is: if third 
countries already share the values of the EU, what need is there for the EU to promote 
them?
21 
 
 
While the first ENP official documents emphasised both regional integration
22 and bilateral 
relations, in fact the latter is predominant. In particular, the ENP is operationalised through 
                                                 
19 Commission Communication “Wider Europe…”, cit., p. 10.  
20  N.  Tocci,  “Does  the  ENP  Respond  to  the  EU’s  Post-Enlargement  Challenge?”,  The  International 
Spectator, Volume XL, No. 1, January-March 2005, p. 26.  
21  N.  Tocci,  ibidem;  M.  Cremona, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues”, 
CDDRLWorking  Papers,  Number  25,  2  November  2004,  available  at  http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20738/Cremona-ENP_and_the_Rule_of_Law.pdf  
22 The Wider Europe Communication states that it encourages regional and sub-regional integration: in the 
context of a new EU neighbourhood policy, further regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration   10 
the  Action  Plans  that  are  negotiated  between  Brussels  and  the  single  neighbouring 
country. The Action Plans resemble the Accession Partnerships
23 that were negotiated 
between the EU and the candidate countries within the pre-accession strategy. Formally, 
the Action Plans are political documents that are agreed through a simplified procedure by 
the two parts in order to enhance and speed up a number of political objective. They are 
not legally binding international agreements, as the contractual relations between the two 
parts  are  already  regulated  by  other  formal  international  agreements  that  are  the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements in the case of the ENP
24, and were the Europe Agreements in the case of the 
candidate  countries  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  throughout  the  1990s.  The 
relationship between the contractual agreements and the Action Plans can be compared to 
the relationship between the train tracks and the timetable
25: while the former delimit the 
policy areas of co-operation, the latter emphasise the political priorities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
amongst  the  countries  of  the  Southern  Mediterranean  will  be  strongly  encouraged.  New  initiatives  to 
encourage  regional  cooperation  between  Russia  and  the  countries  of  the  Western  NIS  might  also  be 
considered. These could draw upon the Northern Dimension concept to take a broader and more inclusive 
approach to dealing with neighbourhood issues. Commission Communication “Wider Europe…”, cit., p.8.  
23  According  to  E.  Tulmets,  the  Commission  relied  on  the  experience  of  the  Accession Partnerships to 
propose  the  first  Action  Plans  and  on  the  National  Programme  of  the  Adaptation  to  the  Acquis  for  the 
Country Strategy Papers with neighbouring countries. E. Tulmets, “Adapting the Experience of Enlargement 
to the Neighbourhood Policy: The ENP as a Substitute to Enlargement?” in The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, Institute of International Relations, Prague, 2006, p. 42.  
24 The PCAs regulate the relations between the EU and the Eastern and South-Caucasus Neighbours, while 
the  Euro-Mediterranean  Association  Agreements  regulate  the  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  South-
Mediterranean Neighbours. For the complete list of Action Plans and contractual relations with neighbours 
see table 1.  
25 Interview with an official from the Commission, Directorate General External Relations and 
Neighbourhood Policy, September 2006.  
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Table 1. State of play of ENP Action Plans 
ENP partner 
countries 
Entry into force of 
contractual relations 
with EC 
ENP 
Country 
Report 
ENP Action 
Plan 
Adoption by 
EU 
Adoption by 
partner country 
Algeria  AA – Sept 2005  --  --  --  -- 
Armenia  PCA – 1999  March 
2005 
Agreed 
autumn 
2006 
13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Azerbaijan  PCA – 1999  March 
2005 
Agreed 
autumn 
2006 
13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Belarus  --  --  --  --  -- 
Egypt  AA – Jun 2004  March 
2005 
Largely 
agreed 
autumn 
2006 
06.03.2007  06.03.2007 
Georgia  PCA – 1999  March 
2005 
Agreed 
autumn 
2006 
13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Israel  AA - Jun 2000  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  11.04.2005 
Jordan  AA - May 2002  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  11.01.2005 
02.06.2005 
Lebanon  AA - April 2006  March 
2005 
Agreed 
autumn 
2006 
17.10.2006  Pending 
Libya  --  --  --  --  -- 
Moldova  PCA - Jul 1998  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  22.02.2005 
Morocco  AA - Mar 2000  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  27.07.2005 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Interim AA - Jul 
1997 
May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  04.05.2005 
Syria  --  --  --  --  -- 
Tunisia  AA – Mar 1998  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  04.07.2005 
Ukraine  PCA – Mar 1998  May 2004  Agreed end 
2004 
21.02.2005  21.02.2005 
* AA: Association Agreement 
** PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement   12 
Source:  update  by  the  author  of  a  table  elaborated  by  the  European  Commission.    Press  release 
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy Reference:  IP/06/1676    Date:  04/12/2006   
 
Indeed, the ENP borrowed some of its concepts and instruments from enlargement policy, 
as some authors have rightly argued
26. According to Judith Kelley, the ENP is a policy that, 
like  enlargement,  combines  conditionality  and  socialisation  strategies
27.  The  “Wider 
Europe” Communication explicitly offered a quid pro quo to neighbouring countries: “in 
return for progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms… the countries… should be offered a stake in the EU’s 
Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of 
persons, goods, services and capital”
28. Similarly, the 2004 Strategy Paper drafted by the 
Commission
29  stated  that  “the  ambition  and  the  pace  of  development  of  the  EU’s 
relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common 
values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities”
30. However, while 
positive conditionality (providing of assistance and benefits to the neighbouring countries 
willing to implement reforms, exists in ENP
31, negative conditionality (suspending a benefit 
when reforms are not being carried out) does not
32.  
As for socialisation
33, the emphasis put by the EU on dialogue and contacts at multiple 
levels
34, is reminiscent of enlargement strategy, when EU officials travelled to candidate 
states to negotiate but also to stimulate domestic debates on issues such as democracy, 
ethnic minority politics and human rights.  
                                                 
26 See, for instance, R. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP:…”, cit. E. Tulmets, “Adapting the 
Experience of Enlargement…”, cit.  
27  J.  Kelley,  “New  Wine  in  Old  Wineskins:  Promoting  Political  Reforms  through  the  New  European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 44, Number 1, p.30.  
28 Commission Communication “Wider Europe…”, cit.. 
29 Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 
373 final, Brussels, May 12, 2004.  
30 Commission Communication ENP Strategy Paper, cit.  
31  According  to  the  Commissioner  B.  Ferrero  Waldner,  “ENP  is  based  on  the  same  kind  of  positive 
conditionality  that  underpins  the  enlargement  process…  In  addition,  progress  is  rewarded  with  greater 
incentives  and  benefits.  Only  as  our  partners  fulfil  their  commitments  to  strengthen  the  rule  of  law, 
democracy and respect for human rights; promote market-oriented economic reforms; and cooperate on key 
foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Will 
we offer an even deeper relationship”. B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy:…”, cit., p. 
140.  
32 For a comprehensive analysis of how conditionality was applied during the latest enlargement round, see 
K. Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality” in M. Cremona, The Enlargement 
of the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 105-139.  
33  According  to  I.  Johnston,  “Socialisation  is  when  actors  generate  behaviour  changes  by  creating 
reputational pressures through shaming, persuasion and other efforts to socialise state actors”, I. Johnston, 
“Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No.4, 
pp. 487-516, cit. in J. Kelley, cit., p. 39. 
34 J. Kelley, cit., p.39.   13 
 
How effective can ENP be? 
 
Since enlargement is considered to have been extremely effective as a means to stabilise 
and make more democratic and prosperous the Central and Eastern European countries - 
to the point that it is often considered to be the most successful case of European foreign 
policy – and since the ENP has borrowed many features from enlargement strategy, we 
will try to analyse  whether or not the ENP can pursue the goals of 1) avoiding the creation 
of new dividing lines in Europe; and 2) developing a ring of stable, prosperous and well-
governed countries by referring to comparisons between the two policies. 
Let us first try to assess the implementation  of the ENP thus far. Although it is certainly 
too early to assess whether the ENP is effectively pursuing its objectives, it is worth taking 
into consideration the indications provided in the December 2006 Communication from the 
Commission “On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”
35, that is the first 
general review of the implementation of the ENP since its inception. The December 2006 
Communication  reaffirms  that  “greater  economic  development  and  stability  and  better 
governance in its neighbourhood”
36 is the premise of the ENP. However, it concedes that 
the policy needs to be strengthened, particularly in light of the fact that if the EU fails to 
support the reforms efforts of its neighbours, there will be for the EU a “prohibitive potential 
cost [in terms of security]”
37 . The Commission suggests making the policy more attractive 
to  neighbours by offering them more and better benefits, such as more EU involvement in 
addressing  frozen  conflicts,  more  funding  possibilities  and  the  facilitation  of  visa 
requirements for the neighbouring countries’ citizens that wish to visit EU countries. In 
addition,  the  Communication  introduces  a  distinction  between  the  “willing”  and  the 
“hesitant” countries. With regard to the former, the Commission suggests that the EU help 
their reform process and make it “faster, better and a lower cost to their citizens”
38. As for 
the latter, they should be convinced and be provided with more incentives.  
One can easily read between the lines that while the ENP is not working effectively with 
hesitant countries, it also shows shortcomings with regard to willing countries.  
                                                 
35 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 December 2006, 
COM(2006)726 final.  
36 Commission Communication “On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, cit., p.2. 
37 Ibidem.  
38 Ibidem.   14 
The  point  is: which neighbours are willing and which ones are hesitant? First of all, it 
should be considered that some of the countries included in the ENP still do not have an 
Action  Plan  with  the  EU.  Even  ignoring    the  case  of  Russia,  which  refused  since  the 
inception of the ENP to be part of this framework, since it felt that being a big power it had 
to  be  treated  by  the  EU  as  such  and  chose  to  conduct  strictly  bilateral  relations  with 
Brussels, some of the neighbouring countries do not have an Action Plan because they do 
not have a contractual relationship with the EU (Belarus, Libya, Syria), others because 
they are not interested in negotiating an AP (Algeria), or because the negotiations still 
have to be concluded. Among the countries that have an AP in place with the EU, it is 
certainly too early to take into consideration those countries whose AP has been agreed 
too recently – even though some trends are already well visible - such as Egypt (March 
2007),  Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and  Georgia  (November  2006).  On  the  contrary,  a  first 
assessment  of  the  ENP  can  be  carried  out  with  reference  to  the  countries  that  have 
approved an ENP AP in 2005 (Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, 
Ukraine and Tunisia).  
 
The  outcome  is  mixed:  some  neighbours,  such  as  Ukraine,  Georgia,  Moldova  and, 
partially,  Armenia  are  carrying  out  a  considerable  reform  package,  even  though 
progresses  are  not  being  made  uniformly  in  all  areas.  The  most  interesting  case  is 
certainly Ukraine for its important geostrategic positioning, between the EU and Russia 
and on the Black Sea, for its status as transit country for gas and oil pipelines from the 
East to the West and for its notable size, with about 50 million inhabitants. Certainly, the 
first points of the Action Plan with Ukraine, that envisaged the holding of free and fair 
elections (presidential in autumn 2004 and legislative in spring 2006) have been finally 
fulfilled. Other important goals have also been met, such as maintaining a free media; co-
operating with the EU border assistance mission in Transdnistria; signing a memorandum 
of understanding on energy co-operation, and approximating laws, standards and norms to 
the  EU  level.  In  addition,  the  EU  granted  market  status  economy  to  Ukraine  and  a 
facilitation of the visa regime, in exchange for the signing of a re-admission agreement. On 
the other hand, progress is still badly needed in areas such as administrative and judicial 
reform, the fight against corruption, and the effort to improve the climate for business and 
investment
39. Moreover, a new electoral law still needs to be approved that will enable the 
political system to function better than it does today, with recurrent crises and turf wars 
                                                 
39 C. Grant, “Europe’s Blurred Boundaries…”, p. 54.    15 
between the President and the Prime Minister. If the Ukraine continues to show a good 
record of implementing its Action Plan, the EU has promised that it would negotiate an 
“enhanced agreement” to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with 
the EU in 2008.  
 
While Ukraine shows an overall good record in ENP implementation, it is controversial to 
what extent the EU has contributed to avoiding the creation of new dividing lines and to 
ensuring  stability  and  prosperity.  With  the  entry  of  Poland  into  the  EU  in  2004,  the 
imposition of the Schengen acquis to the border movements between Poland and Ukraine 
led  to  a  reduction  in  the  cross-border  traffic  by  a  factor  of  seven
40.  The  problem  was 
partially solved with the introduction of the so called L-type visas for local border traffic for 
residents living within 50 kilometres from the EU’s external border.  
Even the EU’s decisive role in the Orange Revolution in late 2004 was a success, but was 
more the result of strong pressures and personal initiatives by the leaders of Poland and 
Lithuania than the achievement of ENP.  
 
Turning  from  the  East  to  the  South,  the  “best  pupil”  among  Southern  Mediterranean 
countries  is  certainly  Morocco,    which  no  longer  aspires  to  EU  membership  after  its 
application to the EC was rejected by the Commission in 1987, but  nonetheless wishes to 
integrate  more  with  the  EU  today
41.  The  progress  of  Morocco  on  the  Action  Plan  is 
considerable, especially with regard to economic and trade issues
42. Progress in civil and 
political reforms is slower: Morocco, which is the North African country that has scored 
better in the field – the Monarchy has made important reforms, from the family code to 
decentralisation – is still far from being a democracy. 
 
Also Tunisia is doing well in the area of economic reforms, though much less in that of 
political  reforms.  However,  considering  its  reluctance  to  actively  engage  in  the  field  of 
human rights, its acceptance of a sub-committee on political dialogue and human rights is 
considered  an  important  achievement  for  the  ENP
43.  Jordan  has  also  embarked  on  a 
programme of national reforms modelled on its Action Plan. 
                                                 
40 M. Comelli, E. Greco and N. Tocci, “From Boundary to Borderland…”, cit., p.12.  
41 See M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva and N. Popescu, “European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time 
indeed for an ENP Plus”, CEPS Policy Brief no. 126, March 2007, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, p. 9.  
42 Interview with Commission official, Brussels, September 2006.  
43 Interview with Commission official, Brussels, September 2006.   16 
Leaving aside Israel, whose political and economic degree is more similar to that of a 
European  than  a  South  Mediterranean  country,  the  other  partners  of  the  EU  on  the 
Southern rim of the Mediterranean all show reluctance to engage in reforms, particularly in 
the field of democracy and human rights. These should be two characteristic of a “well-
governed”  country  (see  above),  but  the  EU  seems  more  interested  in  favouring  a 
partnership with the existing regimes, even when these regimes violate human rights, in 
order to maintain stability and avoid “surprises”, such as the electoral success of Islamic 
political movements,  rather than pressing them to make reforms. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Association  Agreements  did  include  elements  of  negative  conditionality:  in  case  of  a 
material breach of the clauses of the agreement, which includes the respect of human 
rights,  the  agreements  could  be  suspended.  Even  though  the  suspension  of  the 
agreements was never invoked by the EU, not even in cases of open violation of human 
rights,  they  were  at  least  enshrined  in  the  agreement.  Such  clauses  are  not  even 
mentioned or referred to in the Action Plans. 
 
This overview, though very brief, already gives us an important indication: aside  from 
enlargement, it seems that the ENP cannot be very effective in pursuing its aims. Why? 
First of all, it should be stressed that the political and economic conditions of the then 
applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s were better than those 
of the neighbours now. But the main difference is the willingness. EU neighbours are less 
willing to go through costly and long reforms for a number of reasons. Eastern neighbours 
like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would like at least a membership perspective as a 
reward for their efforts. Therefore, the leverage of the EU in triggering reforms without 
granting a membership perspective is less strong. In addition, the influence of Russia and 
of its traditional RealPolitik foreign policy in the area is still strong and has an impact on 
surrounding countries, such as Ukraine. 
 
In the absence of any interest in an eventual future accession to the EU, and out of fear 
that political reforms and human rights improvements may lead to their fall from power, the 
political regimes of South Mediterranean neighbours try not to engage in change and  are 
in most cases prone  to only carrying out economic and trade reforms.  
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The way forward 
 
The EU cannot be very effective in building security in its neighbourhood through the ENP, 
in the same or in a similar way as it has done with the European integration process first 
and  with  the  Eastern  enlargement  afterwards.  In  order  to  secure  a  real  and  effective 
process of political and economic reforms – which, in its turn, would contribute to avoiding 
new dividing lines in Europe and to creating a ring of well-governed countries - the EU 
should promise more tangible benefits to its neighbours, as the Commission itself has 
acknowledged  in  the  December  2006  Communication  (see  above).  In  the  difficulty  of 
replicating the enlargement method, mutatis mutandis, to the neighbours, the EU should 
also look for other methods, resorting more to the instruments available in the area of 
CFSP and ESDP. Ukraine and Moldova already subscribed to most of CFSP declarations. 
Other neighbours should follow suit. In addition, neighbours should be consulted more 
frequently on foreign and security policy issues, notably when the discussion involves a 
security issue that is  of direct concern to them (for example Moldova and Ukraine when 
the issue of the frozen conflict in Transdnistria is discussed). They could take part in the 
discussions taking place at the margins of the Council of General Affairs and External 
Relations (Cagre), though unable to vote as non-EU members . They could also be invited 
to  contribute  troops  and  assets  for  EU  missions  (even  without  being  integrated  in  the 
ESDP decision-making structure) , as Ukraine and Morocco have already begun to do, 
although on a limited scale. On the contrary, the EU should be more flexible and realistic 
when asking for the adoption of the long and complex acquis communautaire. A selective 
approach would help the neighbours to be effective at least in a few areas that need to be 
considered as a priority.  
 
While the EU should not abandon the valuable aims of the ENP, it should try to be more 
creative when it comes to the instruments and resort more to foreign policy instruments. 
This will be easier to achieve if the Constitutional Treaty or at least the core of its reforms 
in CFSP and ESDP are to enter into force. 
 
 
 
 
 